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fairXiv Pronounced fair • kive

16737 latest Fairness/Ethics + ML/AI papers

Imagen 3

Imagen-Team-Google, :, Jason Baldridge, Jakob Bauer, Mukul Bhutani, Nicole Brichtova, Andrew Bunner, Kelvin Chan, Yichang Chen, Sander Dieleman, Yuqing Du, Zach Eaton-Rosen, Hongliang Fei, Nando de Freitas, Yilin Gao, Evgeny Gladchenko, Sergio Gómez Colmenarejo, Mandy Guo, Alex Haig, Will Hawkins, Hexiang Hu, Huilian Huang, Tobenna Peter Igwe, Christos Kaplanis, Siavash Khodadadeh, Yelin Kim, Ksenia Konyushkova, Karol Langner, Eric Lau, Shixin Luo, Soňa Mokrá, Henna Nandwani, Yasumasa Onoe, Aäron van den Oord, Zarana Parekh, Jordi Pont-Tuset, Hang Qi, Rui Qian, Deepak Ramachandran, Poorva Rane, Abdullah Rashwan, Ali Razavi, Robert Riachi, Hansa Srinivasan, Srivatsan Srinivasan, Robin Strudel, Benigno Uria, Oliver Wang, Su Wang, Austin Waters, Chris Wolff, Auriel Wright, Zhisheng Xiao, Hao Xiong, Keyang Xu, Marc van Zee, Junlin Zhang, Katie Zhang, Wenlei Zhou, Konrad Zolna, Ola Aboubakar, Canfer Akbulut, Oscar Akerlund, Isabela Albuquerque, Nina Anderson, Marco Andreetto, Lora Aroyo, Ben Bariach, David Barker, Sherry Ben, Dana Berman, Courtney Biles, Irina Blok, Pankil Botadra, Jenny Brennan, Karla Brown, John Buckley, Rudy Bunel, Elie Bursztein, Christina Butterfield, Ben Caine, Viral Carpenter, Norman Casagrande, Ming-Wei Chang, Solomon Chang, Shamik Chaudhuri, Tony Chen, John Choi, Dmitry Churbanau, Nathan Clement, Matan Cohen, Forrester Cole, Mikhail Dektiarev, Vincent Du, Praneet Dutta, Tom Eccles, Ndidi Elue, Ashley Feden, Shlomi Fruchter, Frankie Garcia, Roopal Garg, Weina Ge, Ahmed Ghazy, Bryant Gipson, Andrew Goodman, Dawid Górny, Sven Gowal, Khyatti Gupta, Yoni Halpern, Yena Han, Susan Hao, Jamie Hayes, Amir Hertz, Ed Hirst, Tingbo Hou, Heidi Howard, Mohamed Ibrahim, Dirichi Ike-Njoku, Joana Iljazi, Vlad Ionescu, William Isaac, Reena Jana, Gemma Jennings, Donovon Jenson, Xuhui Jia, Kerry Jones, Xiaoen Ju, Ivana Kajic, Christos Kaplanis, Burcu Karagol Ayan, Jacob Kelly, Suraj Kothawade, Christina Kouridi, Ira Ktena, Jolanda Kumakaw, Dana Kurniawan, Dmitry Lagun, Lily Lavitas, Jason Lee, Tao Li, Marco Liang, Maggie Li-Calis, Yuchi Liu, Javier Lopez Alberca, Peggy Lu, Kristian Lum, Yukun Ma, Chase Malik, John Mellor, Inbar Mosseri, Tom Murray, Aida Nematzadeh, Paul Nicholas, João Gabriel Oliveira, Guillermo Ortiz-Jimenez, Michela Paganini, Tom Le Paine, Roni Paiss, Alicia Parrish, Anne Peckham, Vikas Peswani, Igor Petrovski, Tobias Pfaff, Alex Pirozhenko, Ryan Poplin, Utsav Prabhu, Yuan Qi, Matthew Rahtz, Cyrus Rashtchian, Charvi Rastogi, Amit Raul, Ali Razavi, Sylvestre-Alvise Rebuffi, Susanna Ricco, Felix Riedel, Dirk Robinson, Pankaj Rohatgi, Bill Rosgen, Sarah Rumbley, Moonkyung Ryu, Anthony Salgado, Sahil Singla, Florian Schroff, Candice Schumann, Tanmay Shah, Brendan Shillingford, Kaushik Shivakumar, Dennis Shtatnov, Zach Singer, Evgeny Sluzhaev, Valerii Sokolov, Thibault Sottiaux, Florian Stimberg, Brad Stone, David Stutz, Yu-Chuan Su, Eric Tabellion, Shuai Tang, David Tao, Kurt Thomas, Gregory Thornton, Andeep Toor, Cristian Udrescu, Aayush Upadhyay, Cristina Vasconcelos, Alex Vasiloff, Andrey Voynov, Amanda Walker, Luyu Wang, Miaosen Wang, Simon Wang, Stanley Wang, Qifei Wang, Yuxiao Wang, Ágoston Weisz, Olivia Wiles, Chenxia Wu, Xingyu Federico Xu, Andrew Xue, Jianbo Yang, Luo Yu, Mete Yurtoglu, Ali Zand, Han Zhang, Jiageng Zhang, Catherine Zhao, Adilet Zhaxybay, Miao Zhou, Shengqi Zhu, Zhenkai Zhu, Dawn Bloxwich, Mahyar Bordbar, Luis C. Cobo, Eli Collins, Shengyang Dai, Tulsee Doshi, Anca Dragan, Douglas Eck, Demis Hassabis, Sissie Hsiao, Tom Hume, Koray Kavukcuoglu, Helen King, Jack Krawczyk, Yeqing Li, Kathy Meier-Hellstern, Andras Orban, Yury Pinsky, Amar Subramanya, Oriol Vinyals, Ting Yu, Yori Zwols

arXiv:2408.07009v1 »Full PDF »
We introduce Imagen 3, a latent diffusion model that generates high quality images from text prompts. We describe our quality and responsibility evaluations. Imagen 3 is preferred over other state-of-the-art (SOTA) models at the time of evaluation. In addition, we discuss issues around safety and representation, as well as methods we used to minimize the potential harm of our models.Abstract

Underspecification in Scene Description-to-Depiction Tasks

Ben Hutchinson, Jason Baldridge, Vinodkumar Prabhakaran

arXiv:2210.05815v1 »Full PDF »
Questions regarding implicitness, ambiguity and underspecification are crucial for understanding the task validity and ethical concerns of multimodal image+text systems, yet have received little attention to date. This position paper maps out a conceptual framework to address this gap, focusing on systems which generate images depicting scenes from scene descriptions. In doing so, we account for how texts and images convey meaning differently. We outline a set of core challenges concerning textual and visual ambiguity, as well as risks that may be amplified by ambiguous and underspecified elements. We propose and discuss strategies for addressing these challenges, including generating visually ambiguous images, and generating a set of diverse images.Abstract

BehaviorGPT: Smart Agent Simulation for Autonomous Driving with Next-Patch Prediction

Zikang Zhou, Haibo Hu, Xinhong Chen, Jianping Wang, Nan Guan, Kui Wu, Yung-Hui Li, Yu-Kai Huang, Chun Jason Xue

arXiv:2405.17372v3 »Full PDF »

NeurIPS 2024

Simulating realistic behaviors of traffic agents is pivotal for efficiently validating the safety of autonomous driving systems. Existing data-driven simulators primarily use an encoder-decoder architecture to encode the historical trajectories before decoding the future. However, the heterogeneity between encoders and decoders complicates the models, and the manual separation of historical and future trajectories leads to low data utilization. Given these limitations, we propose BehaviorGPT, a homogeneous and fully autoregressive Transformer designed to simulate the sequential behavior of multiple agents. Crucially, our approach discards the traditional separation between "history" and "future" by modeling each time step as the "current" one for motion generation, leading to a simpler, more parameter- and data-efficient agent simulator. We further introduce the Next-Patch Prediction Paradigm (NP3) to mitigate the negative effects of autoregressive modeling, in which models are trained to reason at the patch level of trajectories and capture long-range spatial-temporal interactions. Despite having merely 3M model parameters, BehaviorGPT won first place in the 2024 Waymo Open Sim Agents Challenge with a realism score of 0.7473 and a minADE score of 1.4147, demonstrating its exceptional performance in traffic agent simulation.Abstract

Stochastic Monkeys at Play: Random Augmentations Cheaply Break LLM Safety Alignment

Jason Vega, Junsheng Huang, Gaokai Zhang, Hangoo Kang, Minjia Zhang, Gagandeep Singh

arXiv:2411.02785v1 »Full PDF »

Under peer review

Safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) has recently become a critical objective of model developers. In response, a growing body of work has been investigating how safety alignment can be bypassed through various jailbreaking methods, such as adversarial attacks. However, these jailbreak methods can be rather costly or involve a non-trivial amount of creativity and effort, introducing the assumption that malicious users are high-resource or sophisticated. In this paper, we study how simple random augmentations to the input prompt affect safety alignment effectiveness in state-of-the-art LLMs, such as Llama 3 and Qwen 2. We perform an in-depth evaluation of 17 different models and investigate the intersection of safety under random augmentations with multiple dimensions: augmentation type, model size, quantization, fine-tuning-based defenses, and decoding strategies (e.g., sampling temperature). We show that low-resource and unsophisticated attackers, i.e. stochastic monkeys, can significantly improve their chances of bypassing alignment with just 25 random augmentations per prompt.Abstract

Whither Bias Goes, I Will Go: An Integrative, Systematic Review of Algorithmic Bias Mitigation

Louis Hickman, Christopher Huynh, Jessica Gass, Brandon Booth, Jason Kuruzovich, Louis Tay

arXiv:2410.19003v2 »Full PDF »

forthcoming in Journal of Applied Psychology

Machine learning (ML) models are increasingly used for personnel assessment and selection (e.g., resume screeners, automatically scored interviews). However, concerns have been raised throughout society that ML assessments may be biased and perpetuate or exacerbate inequality. Although organizational researchers have begun investigating ML assessments from traditional psychometric and legal perspectives, there is a need to understand, clarify, and integrate fairness operationalizations and algorithmic bias mitigation methods from the computer science, data science, and organizational research literatures. We present a four-stage model of developing ML assessments and applying bias mitigation methods, including 1) generating the training data, 2) training the model, 3) testing the model, and 4) deploying the model. When introducing the four-stage model, we describe potential sources of bias and unfairness at each stage. Then, we systematically review definitions and operationalizations of algorithmic bias, legal requirements governing personnel selection from the United States and Europe, and research on algorithmic bias mitigation across multiple domains and integrate these findings into our framework. Our review provides insights for both research and practice by elucidating possible mechanisms of algorithmic bias while identifying which bias mitigation methods are legal and effective. This integrative framework also reveals gaps in the knowledge of algorithmic bias mitigation that should be addressed by future collaborative research between organizational researchers, computer scientists, and data scientists. We provide recommendations for developing and deploying ML assessments, as well as recommendations for future research into algorithmic bias and fairness.Abstract

GPT-4o System Card

OpenAI, :, Aaron Hurst, Adam Lerer, Adam P. Goucher, Adam Perelman, Aditya Ramesh, Aidan Clark, AJ Ostrow, Akila Welihinda, Alan Hayes, Alec Radford, Aleksander Mądry, Alex Baker-Whitcomb, Alex Beutel, Alex Borzunov, Alex Carney, Alex Chow, Alex Kirillov, Alex Nichol, Alex Paino, Alex Renzin, Alex Tachard Passos, Alexander Kirillov, Alexi Christakis, Alexis Conneau, Ali Kamali, Allan Jabri, Allison Moyer, Allison Tam, Amadou Crookes, Amin Tootoochian, Amin Tootoonchian, Ananya Kumar, Andrea Vallone, Andrej Karpathy, Andrew Braunstein, Andrew Cann, Andrew Codispoti, Andrew Galu, Andrew Kondrich, Andrew Tulloch, Andrey Mishchenko, Angela Baek, Angela Jiang, Antoine Pelisse, Antonia Woodford, Anuj Gosalia, Arka Dhar, Ashley Pantuliano, Avi Nayak, Avital Oliver, Barret Zoph, Behrooz Ghorbani, Ben Leimberger, Ben Rossen, Ben Sokolowsky, Ben Wang, Benjamin Zweig, Beth Hoover, Blake Samic, Bob McGrew, Bobby Spero, Bogo Giertler, Bowen Cheng, Brad Lightcap, Brandon Walkin, Brendan Quinn, Brian Guarraci, Brian Hsu, Bright Kellogg, Brydon Eastman, Camillo Lugaresi, Carroll Wainwright, Cary Bassin, Cary Hudson, Casey Chu, Chad Nelson, Chak Li, Chan Jun Shern, Channing Conger, Charlotte Barette, Chelsea Voss, Chen Ding, Cheng Lu, Chong Zhang, Chris Beaumont, Chris Hallacy, Chris Koch, Christian Gibson, Christina Kim, Christine Choi, Christine McLeavey, Christopher Hesse, Claudia Fischer, Clemens Winter, Coley Czarnecki, Colin Jarvis, Colin Wei, Constantin Koumouzelis, Dane Sherburn, Daniel Kappler, Daniel Levin, Daniel Levy, David Carr, David Farhi, David Mely, David Robinson, David Sasaki, Denny Jin, Dev Valladares, Dimitris Tsipras, Doug Li, Duc Phong Nguyen, Duncan Findlay, Edede Oiwoh, Edmund Wong, Ehsan Asdar, Elizabeth Proehl, Elizabeth Yang, Eric Antonow, Eric Kramer, Eric Peterson, Eric Sigler, Eric Wallace, Eugene Brevdo, Evan Mays, Farzad Khorasani, Felipe Petroski Such, Filippo Raso, Francis Zhang, Fred von Lohmann, Freddie Sulit, Gabriel Goh, Gene Oden, Geoff Salmon, Giulio Starace, Greg Brockman, Hadi Salman, Haiming Bao, Haitang Hu, Hannah Wong, Haoyu Wang, Heather Schmidt, Heather Whitney, Heewoo Jun, Hendrik Kirchner, Henrique Ponde de Oliveira Pinto, Hongyu Ren, Huiwen Chang, Hyung Won Chung, Ian Kivlichan, Ian O'Connell, Ian O'Connell, Ian Osband, Ian Silber, Ian Sohl, Ibrahim Okuyucu, Ikai Lan, Ilya Kostrikov, Ilya Sutskever, Ingmar Kanitscheider, Ishaan Gulrajani, Jacob Coxon, Jacob Menick, Jakub Pachocki, James Aung, James Betker, James Crooks, James Lennon, Jamie Kiros, Jan Leike, Jane Park, Jason Kwon, Jason Phang, Jason Teplitz, Jason Wei, Jason Wolfe, Jay Chen, Jeff Harris, Jenia Varavva, Jessica Gan Lee, Jessica Shieh, Ji Lin, Jiahui Yu, Jiayi Weng, Jie Tang, Jieqi Yu, Joanne Jang, Joaquin Quinonero Candela, Joe Beutler, Joe Landers, Joel Parish, Johannes Heidecke, John Schulman, Jonathan Lachman, Jonathan McKay, Jonathan Uesato, Jonathan Ward, Jong Wook Kim, Joost Huizinga, Jordan Sitkin, Jos Kraaijeveld, Josh Gross, Josh Kaplan, Josh Snyder, Joshua Achiam, Joy Jiao, Joyce Lee, Juntang Zhuang, Justyn Harriman, Kai Fricke, Kai Hayashi, Karan Singhal, Katy Shi, Kavin Karthik, Kayla Wood, Kendra Rimbach, Kenny Hsu, Kenny Nguyen, Keren Gu-Lemberg, Kevin Button, Kevin Liu, Kiel Howe, Krithika Muthukumar, Kyle Luther, Lama Ahmad, Larry Kai, Lauren Itow, Lauren Workman, Leher Pathak, Leo Chen, Li Jing, Lia Guy, Liam Fedus, Liang Zhou, Lien Mamitsuka, Lilian Weng, Lindsay McCallum, Lindsey Held, Long Ouyang, Louis Feuvrier, Lu Zhang, Lukas Kondraciuk, Lukasz Kaiser, Luke Hewitt, Luke Metz, Lyric Doshi, Mada Aflak, Maddie Simens, Madelaine Boyd, Madeleine Thompson, Marat Dukhan, Mark Chen, Mark Gray, Mark Hudnall, Marvin Zhang, Marwan Aljubeh, Mateusz Litwin, Matthew Zeng, Max Johnson, Maya Shetty, Mayank Gupta, Meghan Shah, Mehmet Yatbaz, Meng Jia Yang, Mengchao Zhong, Mia Glaese, Mianna Chen, Michael Janner, Michael Lampe, Michael Petrov, Michael Wu, Michele Wang, Michelle Fradin, Michelle Pokrass, Miguel Castro, Miguel Oom Temudo de Castro, Mikhail Pavlov, Miles Brundage, Miles Wang, Minal Khan, Mira Murati, Mo Bavarian, Molly Lin, Murat Yesildal, Nacho Soto, Natalia Gimelshein, Natalie Cone, Natalie Staudacher, Natalie Summers, Natan LaFontaine, Neil Chowdhury, Nick Ryder, Nick Stathas, Nick Turley, Nik Tezak, Niko Felix, Nithanth Kudige, Nitish Keskar, Noah Deutsch, Noel Bundick, Nora Puckett, Ofir Nachum, Ola Okelola, Oleg Boiko, Oleg Murk, Oliver Jaffe, Olivia Watkins, Olivier Godement, Owen Campbell-Moore, Patrick Chao, Paul McMillan, Pavel Belov, Peng Su, Peter Bak, Peter Bakkum, Peter Deng, Peter Dolan, Peter Hoeschele, Peter Welinder, Phil Tillet, Philip Pronin, Philippe Tillet, Prafulla Dhariwal, Qiming Yuan, Rachel Dias, Rachel Lim, Rahul Arora, Rajan Troll, Randall Lin, Rapha Gontijo Lopes, Raul Puri, Reah Miyara, Reimar Leike, Renaud Gaubert, Reza Zamani, Ricky Wang, Rob Donnelly, Rob Honsby, Rocky Smith, Rohan Sahai, Rohit Ramchandani, Romain Huet, Rory Carmichael, Rowan Zellers, Roy Chen, Ruby Chen, Ruslan Nigmatullin, Ryan Cheu, Saachi Jain, Sam Altman, Sam Schoenholz, Sam Toizer, Samuel Miserendino, Sandhini Agarwal, Sara Culver, Scott Ethersmith, Scott Gray, Sean Grove, Sean Metzger, Shamez Hermani, Shantanu Jain, Shengjia Zhao, Sherwin Wu, Shino Jomoto, Shirong Wu, Shuaiqi, Xia, Sonia Phene, Spencer Papay, Srinivas Narayanan, Steve Coffey, Steve Lee, Stewart Hall, Suchir Balaji, Tal Broda, Tal Stramer, Tao Xu, Tarun Gogineni, Taya Christianson, Ted Sanders, Tejal Patwardhan, Thomas Cunninghman, Thomas Degry, Thomas Dimson, Thomas Raoux, Thomas Shadwell, Tianhao Zheng, Todd Underwood, Todor Markov, Toki Sherbakov, Tom Rubin, Tom Stasi, Tomer Kaftan, Tristan Heywood, Troy Peterson, Tyce Walters, Tyna Eloundou, Valerie Qi, Veit Moeller, Vinnie Monaco, Vishal Kuo, Vlad Fomenko, Wayne Chang, Weiyi Zheng, Wenda Zhou, Wesam Manassra, Will Sheu, Wojciech Zaremba, Yash Patil, Yilei Qian, Yongjik Kim, Youlong Cheng, Yu Zhang, Yuchen He, Yuchen Zhang, Yujia Jin, Yunxing Dai, Yury Malkov

arXiv:2410.21276v1 »Full PDF »
GPT-4o is an autoregressive omni model that accepts as input any combination of text, audio, image, and video, and generates any combination of text, audio, and image outputs. It's trained end-to-end across text, vision, and audio, meaning all inputs and outputs are processed by the same neural network. GPT-4o can respond to audio inputs in as little as 232 milliseconds, with an average of 320 milliseconds, which is similar to human response time in conversation. It matches GPT-4 Turbo performance on text in English and code, with significant improvement on text in non-English languages, while also being much faster and 50\% cheaper in the API. GPT-4o is especially better at vision and audio understanding compared to existing models. In line with our commitment to building AI safely and consistent with our voluntary commitments to the White House, we are sharing the GPT-4o System Card, which includes our Preparedness Framework evaluations. In this System Card, we provide a detailed look at GPT-4o's capabilities, limitations, and safety evaluations across multiple categories, focusing on speech-to-speech while also evaluating text and image capabilities, and measures we've implemented to ensure the model is safe and aligned. We also include third-party assessments on dangerous capabilities, as well as discussion of potential societal impacts of GPT-4o's text and vision capabilities.Abstract

Generative AI Agents in Autonomous Machines: A Safety Perspective

Jason Jabbour, Vijay Janapa Reddi

arXiv:2410.15489v1 »Full PDF »
The integration of Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) into autonomous machines represents a major paradigm shift in how these systems operate and unlocks new solutions to problems once deemed intractable. Although generative AI agents provide unparalleled capabilities, they also have unique safety concerns. These challenges require robust safeguards, especially for autonomous machines that operate in high-stakes environments. This work investigates the evolving safety requirements when generative models are integrated as agents into physical autonomous machines, comparing these to safety considerations in less critical AI applications. We explore the challenges and opportunities to ensure the safe deployment of generative AI-driven autonomous machines. Furthermore, we provide a forward-looking perspective on the future of AI-driven autonomous systems and emphasize the importance of evaluating and communicating safety risks. As an important step towards addressing these concerns, we recommend the development and implementation of comprehensive safety scorecards for the use of generative AI technologies in autonomous machines.Abstract

Backtracking Improves Generation Safety

Yiming Zhang, Jianfeng Chi, Hailey Nguyen, Kartikeya Upasani, Daniel M. Bikel, Jason Weston, Eric Michael Smith

arXiv:2409.14586v1 »Full PDF »
Text generation has a fundamental limitation almost by definition: there is no taking back tokens that have been generated, even when they are clearly problematic. In the context of language model safety, when a partial unsafe generation is produced, language models by their nature tend to happily keep on generating similarly unsafe additional text. This is in fact how safety alignment of frontier models gets circumvented in the wild, despite great efforts in improving their safety. Deviating from the paradigm of approaching safety alignment as prevention (decreasing the probability of harmful responses), we propose backtracking, a technique that allows language models to "undo" and recover from their own unsafe generation through the introduction of a special [RESET] token. Our method can be incorporated into either SFT or DPO training to optimize helpfulness and harmlessness. We show that models trained to backtrack are consistently safer than baseline models: backtracking Llama-3-8B is four times more safe than the baseline model (6.1\% 1.5\%) in our evaluations without regression in helpfulness. Our method additionally provides protection against four adversarial attacks including an adaptive attack, despite not being trained to do so.Abstract

Evaluating Fairness in Transaction Fraud Models: Fairness Metrics, Bias Audits, and Challenges

Parameswaran Kamalaruban, Yulu Pi, Stuart Burrell, Eleanor Drage, Piotr Skalski, Jason Wong, David Sutton

arXiv:2409.04373v1 »Full PDF »
Ensuring fairness in transaction fraud detection models is vital due to the potential harms and legal implications of biased decision-making. Despite extensive research on algorithmic fairness, there is a notable gap in the study of bias in fraud detection models, mainly due to the field's unique challenges. These challenges include the need for fairness metrics that account for fraud data's imbalanced nature and the tradeoff between fraud protection and service quality. To address this gap, we present a comprehensive fairness evaluation of transaction fraud models using public synthetic datasets, marking the first algorithmic bias audit in this domain. Our findings reveal three critical insights: (1) Certain fairness metrics expose significant bias only after normalization, highlighting the impact of class imbalance. (2) Bias is significant in both service quality-related parity metrics and fraud protection-related parity metrics. (3) The fairness through unawareness approach, which involved removing sensitive attributes such as gender, does not improve bias mitigation within these datasets, likely due to the presence of correlated proxies. We also discuss socio-technical fairness-related challenges in transaction fraud models. These insights underscore the need for a nuanced approach to fairness in fraud detection, balancing protection and service quality, and moving beyond simple bias mitigation strategies. Future work must focus on refining fairness metrics and developing methods tailored to the unique complexities of the transaction fraud domain.Abstract

Recursively Feasible Probabilistic Safe Online Learning with Control Barrier Functions

Fernando Castañeda, Jason J. Choi, Wonsuhk Jung, Bike Zhang, Claire J. Tomlin, Koushil Sreenath

arXiv:2208.10733v3 »Full PDF »

Journal article. Includes the results of the 2021 CDC paper titled "Pointwise feasibility of gauss...

Learning-based control has recently shown great efficacy in performing complex tasks for various applications. However, to deploy it in real systems, it is of vital importance to guarantee the system will stay safe. Control Barrier Functions (CBFs) offer mathematical tools for designing safety-preserving controllers for systems with known dynamics. In this article, we first introduce a model-uncertainty-aware reformulation of CBF-based safety-critical controllers using Gaussian Process (GP) regression to close the gap between an approximate mathematical model and the real system, which results in a second-order cone program (SOCP)-based control design. We then present the pointwise feasibility conditions of the resulting safety controller, highlighting the level of richness that the available system information must meet to ensure safety. We use these conditions to devise an event-triggered online data collection strategy that ensures the recursive feasibility of the learned safety controller. Our method works by constantly reasoning about whether the current information is sufficient to ensure safety or if new measurements under active safe exploration are required to reduce the uncertainty. As a result, our proposed framework can guarantee the forward invariance of the safe set defined by the CBF with high probability, even if it contains a priori unexplored regions. We validate the proposed framework in two numerical simulation experiments.Abstract